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JURISDICTION 
This Petition is brought pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 35-1-83 (1953, as amqnded 1987) which confers 
original jurisdiction in such motion^ for review on the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
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BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Cases No. 86000369 
86000475 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Petitition is for review of a final order of the 
Utah State Industrial Commission. The Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order by the Administrative Law Judge of 
the Industrial Commission were entered March 4, 1987, 
(Exhibit "A"), A Motion for Review was filed by the Workmens' 
Compensation Fund of Utah on March 5, 1987, (Exhibit "B") which 
was denied by the Industrial Commission by Order dated April 1, 
1987, (Exhibit "D"). A Motion for Review was filed by the 
Petitioner/Applicant on March 18, 1987, (Exhibit "C") which 
Motion was denied by order of the Commission dated June 24, 1987, 
(Exhibit "E"). It is the findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order that has been upheld by the Industrial Commission that 
is the subject of this Appeal. 
ISSUES 
This case involves the application of Section 35-1-69, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), which requires the Second 
Injury Fund to compensate employees for disability resulting from 
pre-existing conditions where a new injury either directly 
aggravates the pre-existing condition or results in an additional 
10% permanent partial disability and total permanent partial 
disability from the industrial injury and pre-existing conditions 
is 20% or greater. In the instant case, an employee experienced 
two industrial incidents on separate days while working for the 
same employer. These two incidents cumulatively resulted in 
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medical treatment and a disability of 10%. However, this 
cumulative disability can be broken down so that each incident is 
deemed to have contributed less than 10% to the employee's total 
disability. The issue then is: should this 10% disability serve 
to trigger the requirements of Section 35-1-69, and require 
compensation to the injured employee from the Second Injury Fund 
for his pre-existing conditions. 
FACTS 
The applicant/appellant Laverne Lawrence, was employed 
by Gann Brothers, Inc. as a truck driver operating a heavy 
equipment transporter. On September X0, 1985, while attempting 
to lift the access ramp to a flat-bed trailer that was designed 
for carrying heavy equipment, he wrenched his back and had 
immediate low back pain in the vicinity of his belt line. Mr. 
Lawrence reported the incident, but sought no medical treatment, 
lost no time from work, and received no benefits pursuant to the 
Workers' Compensation statute. 
While working for the same employer, on November 29, 
1985, the applicant/appellant was again required to lift the 
loading ramp of his flat-bed trailer. As he did so he felt pain 
again in the same location in his low back. He reported the 
incident and received medical treatment from a chiropracter for 
approximately one week. These treatments were paid for by his 
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Workers' Compensation Insurance. On February 18, 1986, Mr. 
Lawrence's back became worse and he was ordered not to work by 
his physician. He was diagnosed as having a herniated disc, and 
on March 20, 1986, the disc at L3-4 was removed by Dr. Heiden at 
St. Benedict's Hospital in Ogden, Utah. 
After a hearing, the medical issues were referred to a 
medical panel by the Administrative Law Judge. The Panel 
determined, and the Administrative Law Judge found, that as a 
result of these two industrial incidents and the surgery of 
March 20, 1986, the applicant had incurred a total of 10% 
permanent partial impairment. The Panel allocated 6.7% to the 
November incident and 3.3% to the September incident. 
The Panel found that the applicant had a pre-existing 
laminectomy resulting in a 10% whole person disability, and a 5% 
whole person disability due to the removal of cartilege in his 
left knee. The Panel found that neither the September nor the 
November injuries aggravated either of these pre-existing 
conditions. 
Based upon these findings the Administrative Law Judge 
determined that neither the September nor the November incidents 
aggravated a pre-existing condition, and that neither, by itself, 
resulted in an additional 10% permanent partial impairment, 
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therefore the provisions of Section 35H-69, were not applicable 
and the Second Injury Fund was not Required to compensate the 
applicant for his pre-existing disability. 
Gann Brothers, Inc. was fLnsured by the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah at the tim^ of the September injury, 
but was uninsured at the time of the November injury, and later 
filed for protection in the Bankruptcy Court. As a result, the 
Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah was liable for 3.3% of the medical expenses, 
permanent partial disability, and temporary total disability and 
that the Uninsured Employers Fund wa£ responsible for 6.7% of 
those expenses. The Second Injury Ftind was deemed to have no 
liability. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The purpose of the provisions of Section 35-1-69, to 
encourage employers to hire individuals withpre-existing 
disabilities, is best served by finding that the 10% permanent 
partial disability that results from these two intimately related 
industrial incidents satisfies the requirement of that section 
and mandates compensation by the Second Injury Fund. 
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There are three possible ways of dealing with the 
events described in this case: 
A. The events can be seen as two separate injuries. 
One occurring on September 10,, 1985, and the second occurring on 
November 29, 1985. 
B. The events can be seen as a single injury that 
cumulatively resulted in a failure on November 10, 1985, and the 
need for surgery, a medical panel having allocated one-third of 
the responsibility for the surgery and subsequent disability to 
the September incident and two-thirds of the responsibility to 
the November incident. 
C. The incidents can be viewed as one industrial 
injury occurring on November 29, 1985, that was preceded by an 
event on September 10, 1985, that does not come up to the 
standard required for an industrial injury, and is therefore a 
pre-existing condition. 
The Industrial Commission in its ruling, upholding the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision, appear to have taken 
approach "A" to this situation, holding that there were two 
separate industrial injuries neither of which comes up to the 
required standard of producing a 10% permanent partial disability 
and invoking the compensation to the injured worker provided for 
in Section 69. For the reasons stated below, the ruling is in 
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error in its interpretation of Section 35-1-69 and is arbitrary 
and capricious in its application of Section 69 to the facts in 
this case. 
ARGUIfflWr 
POINT I 
THE PURPOSE OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND, TO ENCOURAGE 
EMPLOYERS TO HIRE PERSONS WITH PRE-EXISTING 
DISABILITIES. IS BEST SERVED BY TREATING"THE INCIDENTS 
OF SEPTEMBER 11, AND NOVEMBER 29. 1985. AS A SINGLE 
INJURY FOR PURPOSES OF APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-1-69. 
Under the first paragraph of Section 35-1-69 (1), the 
Second Injury Fund is to compensate an employer for pre-existing 
conditions if a new injury either (^ ) aggravates that pre-
existing condition or (b) meets the threshold requirement that 
the new injury add an additional 10% permanent partial 
disability, and that the new injufcy plus the pre-existing 
conditions result in a total permanent partial disability of 20%. 
Section 35-1-69 (1), Utah Code Annotated. The principal case 
interpreting this issue is 
The Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevroletf 709 P.2d 1176. 
Here the court gives a thorough anapLysis of the history and 
purposes of the Second Injury Fund and of the provisions of 
Section 69. The court states as follows regarding the purpose of 
Section 35-1-69: 
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"The legislature undoubtedly intended... 
to provide protection for men who had 
already been partially permanently 
disabled, but yet were able to do work. 
Without some provision of this kind, 
employers would be extremely hesitant in 
employing men partially disabled, since 
an injury resulting in partial permanent 
disability of the employee might well 
impose greater liability on the employer than 
a similar injury incurred by a person not 
previously disabled." Second Injury Fund 
v. Streator Chevolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1179, 
quoting from Marker v. Industrial Commission, 
37 P.2d 785, 787 (1934) . 
In this case Mr. Lawrence was already employed, even 
though he had pre-existing back and knee disabilities. At least 
in theory the purpose of Section 35-1-69 had been served, as the 
employer and his insurer could rest assured that they would not 
be held liable for any disability resulting from his pre-existing 
conditions. 
After the incident that occurred on September 10, 1985, 
Mr. Lawrence had obviously had an insult to his back. However, 
this insult had not required any medical treatment or resulted in 
any lost work or disability. It is common knowledge among 
employers that once an individual has had an insult to his back, 
an additional injury is more probable and such injury is likely 
to result in significant disability. An employer might be 
inclined to dismiss Mr. Lawrence after such an insult to his back 
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to avoid being liable for this additional injury and subsequent 
disability. Surely it is an obvious corollary to the stated 
purpose of Section 69 and the Second Injury Fund, that the 
protections provided by the Fund should be extended to an 
individual who is already employed. 
These protections can be so extended by finding that 
any insult that occurred on September 10, 1985, is itself a pre-
existing condition to the November 29, 1985, event that triggered 
the medical expenses and disability. Or, this purpose could be 
supported by finding that since the fijrst injury itself did not 
require any medical treatment, that, standing alone, it is not 
itself an "industrial injury", and does not become an injury 
until the second occurrence on November 29, 1985. But for the 
November 29th injury, there would h&ve been no necessity of 
medical treatment or other compensation for the 
September 10th incident. But for the November 29th injury, there 
would have been no surgery, no lost wages, and no permanent 
partial disability. 
POINT II 
IT IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS TO HOLD THAT THE 
SEPTEMBER 10, AND NOVEMBER 29\. 1985, INCIDENTS 
REPRESENT TWO SEPARATE INJURIES FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-1-^9, REGARDING THE 
COMPENSATION OF AN INJURED EMPLOYEE. 
The court in its discussion of the purpose of the 
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Second Injury Fund and the history of Section 69 in 
Streator Chevrolet, points out that prior to 1981, the statute 
required that the permanent incapacity resulting from the 
combined impairments be "substantially greater" than would have 
been the case had there been no pre-existing incapacity. In 
1981, the statute was amended so as to give precise definition to 
the term "substantially greater". Thus, giving rise to the 10% 
and 20% threshold requirement. The court interpreted this 
threshold as "...no combination of impairments shall be deemed to 
be substantially greater, than the industrial injury impairment 
alone, unless the industrial injury impairment is 10% or more and 
the total impairment from all combined causes is 20% or more, 
Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1181 
(Utah 1985). In ruling that these percentage thresholds were to 
be met based on the whole man rather than the partial man 
disability schedule, the court focused on the fact that "The 
amendments to Section 35-1-69, set the 10% and 20% thresholds in 
order to assure that both the industrial injury and the total 
impairments reach certain fixed levels of seriousness before any 
non-aggravating pre-existing impairments are compensated." 
Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1181, 
(Emphasis ours). The court goes on to point out that to rule 
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otherwise, "... would unfairly deny compensation to those who are 
most handicapped while granting ii to the less severely 
handicapped." 
Thus the court has made cl|ear that the controlling 
principle in interpreting these thresholds, is the seriousness of 
the injury and the compensatory purpose of the statute. Given 
these principles, it is arbitrary and capricious to rule that the 
two incidents that occurred to Mr. Lawrence on September 10, and 
November 29, 1985, are in fact two separate injuries. Such a 
ruling serves no purpose other than td avoid the application of 
the compensation provisions of Sectioh 35-1-69 (1), and thwart 
the purposes of the statute. It is arbitrary to find that the 
September insult to the back was in fact an industrial injury for 
purposes of this section. The applicant did not require any 
medical treatment or lose any time froiti work as a result of what 
happened on September 10, 1985. Although what occurred was 
clearly a reportable accident, had there not been a further 
insult to his back, no compensation ir} any form would have been 
paid. 
Indeed, since the September 1|0, 1985, injury would have 
resulted in no compensation had it not been for the "lighting up" 
that resulted from the November 29, 1985, injury this case can be 
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seen as quite similar to the internal failure cases analyzed by 
the court in Allen v. The Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 
(Utah 1986) . 
The only meaningful difference between the instant case 
and these gradually developing, internal back failure cases, is 
that here we have only a single reported incident of pain that 
pre-existed the final failure in the back. Whereas, in the more 
gradual cases there are many insults to the back that precede the 
"last straw" accident. In the internal failure cases no issue is 
raised arguing that each prior incident where the injured 
employee may have experience prior back pain should be considered 
itself as a separate industrial accident. No one suggests that 
the percentage of disability should be broken down and allocated 
to each one of these incidents as well as the final accident. 
Such an analysis would be completely unworkable. In such cases 
as these, under the Allen analysis, we say that there is one 
industrial accident that occurs on the date and time of the 
accident that brings on the internal failure, and we use the 
whole man percentage that results from the treatment and 
disability subsequent to this last accident in applying the 
threshold requirements of Section 35-1-69 (1). There is no 
meaningful distinction between the instant case and these 
gradually developing cases. 
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POINT III 
THE MEDICAL ALLOCATION OF DISABILITY BETWEEN THE 
SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER INCIDENTS SHOULD BE USED TO 
ALLOCATE LIABILITY AMONG THE VARIOUS INSURANCE 
COMPANIES AND COMPENSATION FUNDS, NOT TO THWART THE 
COMPENSATORY INTENT OF SECTION 35-1-69. 
Section 35-1-69 (1) presents two separate problems that 
have been treated quite differently by the Utah Supreme Court 
decisions. The first has to do wit}i compensating an injured 
employee where the new injury either aggravates a pre-existing 
condition or meets the required threshold of severity. The 
second issue involves the proper apportionment of compensation 
between the employer and the Second Injury Fund to meet the 
stated purpose of the Second Injury Fund that "the liability of 
the employer for compensation. . .shall be for the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the Second 
Injury Fund", Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 fl). 
The issue of allocation of liability has been threshed 
out by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Jacobsen 
Construction v. Hair, 667 P.2d 25, and Richfield Care Center v. 
Torqerson, 773 P. 2d 178. Hair stands for the proposition that 
for purposes of meeting the requirements of Section 69, it is 
appropriate to use a different form of disability ratina than 
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that used for determining the amount of compensation due the 
applicant. For purposes of compensating an applicant, the 
"combined partial impairment" rating based upon the 
American Medical Association Conversion Tables is used. These 
tables combine the percentages of impairment attributable to the 
individual injuries so as "to avoid the possibility, in some 
cases, of separate whole man percentages adding up to a total 
impairment in excess of 100%." However, for apportioning 
liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, the 
"whole man" rating is to be used. Jacobsen Construction v Hair 
667 P.2d 25, 27. 
Torgerson applies Hair in the situation where two 
injuries occurring at different times both contributed to the 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition. In Torgerson the 
applicant was found to have had a pre-existing condition, prior 
to any industrial injury, that involved a whole man impairment of 
2.5%. Then in 1980, the applicant had an industrial injury that 
required medical treatment and resulted in an additional 2.5% 
whole man impairment. In 1982, the applicant had another 
industrial injury that resulted in an additional 2.5% permanent 
partial impairment. The Commission ruled that Hair stood for the 
proposition that, "...the employer's portion of the liability for 
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compensation is equal to the percentage of the permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the industrial injury. Thus, the 
Commission must consider separate accidents serially in order to 
determine the percentage of impairment attributable to each 
accident and the proportion the pre-exjLsting impairment bears to 
the total combined impairment." Richfield Care Center v 
Torqerson, 773 P.2d 178,180. 
Thus, the court went on to apportion liability for the 
1980 accident which had aggravated the first 2.5% impairment and 
added an additional 2.5%, one-half to the Second Injury Fund and 
one-half to the employer. The court abplied these principles to 
the 1982 injury by treating the 5% permanent partial impairment 
that the applicant brought to this injury as a pre-existing 
impairment. When the 1982 injury added an additional 2.5% 
permanent partial impairment to the 5% pre-existing impairment, 
the allocation was one-third to the employer and two-thirds to 
the Second Injury Fund. Thus, for purposes of allocation, the 
first industrial accident and the impairment resulting from it 
became a pre-existing condition of the second industrial 
accident. 
Despite ruling that the pre-existing industrial injury 
is a pre-existing condition for purposes of allocation under 
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Section 35-1-69 (1), the court ruled in David v. The Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 649 P. 2d 82, that a prior industrial injury 
that had already been compensated, was not a "pre-existing 
condition" such that compensation from the Second Injury Fund was 
required under Section 35-1-69. 
Thus, the court rulings make it quite clear that it is 
necessary to treat the issue of compensation to the employee and 
apportionment between employers and injury funds quite 
differently. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the creation of the Second Injury Fund two 
central principles have guided the case law interpreting the 
purposes of The Fund and the statuatory rules governing it. 
First, to encourage employers to hire workers with pre-existing 
conditions by assuring them that they will be liable only for 
those injuries and disabilities that are associated with their 
employment, and secondly to encourage workers with pre-existing 
disabilities to find work by assuring them that they will be 
compensated for all their disabilities should a new injury result 
in a sufficiently severe total disability. This case requires 
the court to apply these guiding principles where an employee 
experienced two industrial injury incidents while working for the 
16 
same employer, the first one requiring no medical treatment or 
compensation of any kind, and the second one resulting in an 
internal failure to the back. The most rational way to deal with 
these incidents and the only way that Rationally applies both of 
these guiding principles to these fact^, is to find that the two 
incidents resulted in a single disability of sufficient severity 
to justify compensating the injured worker for the new injury and 
his pre-existing disabilities as requirled by Section 35-1-69. 
To find that the two insults to the injured workers 
back represent two separate injuries arbitrarily divides a 
disability that would only have exis|ted as a result of both 
events, and thwarts the second purpos^ of the existence of the 
Second Injury Fund. To find that the first injury represents a 
pre-existing condition as to the second injury thwarts both 
purposes of the Second Injury Func}, since the employer is 
relieved of responsibility for an injury that occurred while the 
employee was working for him and the employee is denied 
compensation for his total disability. Where, in reality, that 
total disability meets the required levtel of severity. 
To interpret the two closely related insults to the 
back as a single industrial injury for purposes of the 
application of the thresholds of Section 35-1-69, both satisfies 
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the two primary concerns of the existence of the Second Injury 
Fund and of Section 69, and brings the interpretation of these 
incidents in accord with the medical events and with the court's 
reasoning in its interpretation of internal failure cases. 
Accordingly, petitioner/applicant prays that this court 
order the Industrial Commission to amend its ruling of June 24, 
1987, upholding the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 
the Administrative Law Judge, and Order the Commission to enter 
new Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding; (a) that 
the industrial injury/incident of September 10, 1985, and 
November 29, 1985, cumulatively resulted in a permanent partial 
disability to the petitioner/applicant of 10%; (b) that this 
represents a permanent partial disability that is "substantially 
greater" than the permanent partial disability that pre-existed 
these events; and, that since the pre-existing permanent partial 
impairment of the petitioner/applicant is in excess of 10% that 
the conditions set forth in Section 35-1-69 are satisfied; and, 
that the Commission order the Second Injury Fund to compensate 
the petitioner/applicant for his pre-existing disability. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEROY K. JO^SOJ^r> 
Attorney for Petitioner/Applicant 
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ADDENDUM 
Statute 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
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Denial of Motion for Review 
Petitioner/Applicant: Denial of Motion for Review .... 
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Training of employee. 
(l) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by 
accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes J sustains an industrial injury 
for which either compensation or medical caret or both, is provided by this 
chapter that results in permanent incapacity Which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or 
which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-etristing incapacity, compensa-
tion, medical care, and other related items as outlined in Section 35-1-81, 
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the 
employer for such compensation, medical care, jind other related items shall 
be for the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be paid out of the 
Second Injury Fund provided for in Subsection 3^-1-68 (1), and shall be deter-
mined after assigning the impairment for the industrial injury on a whole 
person uncombined basis and then deducting t|iis percentage from the total 
combined rating. This combined impairment rating may not exceed 100%. 
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury, 
disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and com-
pensation, medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined injuries as provided in this Subsection (1), and (b) where there 
is no such aggravation, no award for combined injuries may be made unless 
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the indus-
trial injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent physical im-
pairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the industrial 
injury, is greater than 20%. In determining thi impairment thresholds and 
assessment of liability in favor of the employee! and apportionment between 
the carrier or employer and the Second Injury Fund, the permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the industrial injury or the pre-existing condition 
or overall impairment, shall be considered on a whole person uncombined 
basis. If the pre-existing incapacity referred to hi this Subsection (l)(b) previ-
ously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial 
disability under this chapter or Chapter 2, Titl|e 35, the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law, such compensation shall be deducted from the liabil-
ity assessed to the Second Injury Fund under this paragraph. 
If the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or othe. 
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subiect to thi* 
section, the employer or its insurance carrier snail be responsible for all such 
temporary benefits, medical care, or other related Items up to the end of the 
period of temporary total disability resulting from the industrial injury. Any 
allocation of disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following 
such period shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the Second 
Injury Fund as provided for in this section, and any payments made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier in excess of itp proportionate share shall be 
recoverable at the time of the award for combined disabilities if any is made. 
A medical panel having the qualifications of (the medical panel set forth in 
Section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and determine 
first, the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and 
conditions including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of perma-
nent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the previously 
existing condition, whether due to accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes. The Industrial Commission shall then assess the liability for perma-
nent partial disability compensation and future medical care to the employer 
on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury only and any amounts remaining to be paid shall be 
payable out of the Second Injury Fund. Medical expenses shall be paid in the 
first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Amounts, if any, which 
have been paid by the employer in excess of the portion attributable to the 
industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out of the Second Injury 
Fund upon written request and verification pf amounts so expended. 
(2) The commission may increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid 
out of this special fund. This increase shall be i|ised for the rehabilitation and 
training of any employee coming under this chapter as may be certified to the 
commission by the Rehabilitation Department c^f the State Board of Education 
as being eligible for rehabilitation and training. There may not be paid out of 
such special fund for rehabilitation ail amoujit in excess of $1,000. 
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Sixteen years ago, the Applicant started having back problems after 
he got out of the service. He eventually received a laminectomy at the L4-5 
level at the St. Francis Hospital of Topeka, Kansas. 
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a Medical 
Panel for its evaluation. The Medical Panel found that the surgery of March 
20, 1986, was 2/3 the result of the industrial accident of November 29, 1985, 
and 1/3 the result of the industrial injury of September 10, 1985. The Panel 
concluded that these two injuries amounted to a new insult to the Applicant's 
back at a different location. The Panel also found that Mr. Lawrence reached 
a fixed state of recovery following his surgery of March 20, 1986, on October 
20, 1986. As a result of the industrial accident of November 29, 1985, the 
Panel found a 6.7% permanent impairment due to the whole person, and a 3.3% 
permanent partial impairment of the whole person due to the industrial 
accident of September 10, 1985. With respect to the pre-existing laminectomy, 
the Panel found a 10% whole person rating as a result of that problem, and a 
5% whole person rating due to the Applicant's pre-existing surgical removal of 
cartilage in his left knee due to a football injury of 1979. Finally, the 
Panel found that neither the industrial injury of September 10, 1985, nor 
November 29, 1985, aggravated a pre-existing condition. The Administrative 
Law Judge adopts the findings of the Medical Panel as his own. 
Pursuant to the findings of the Medical Panel, the Applicant is 
entitled to receive payment for the surgery of March 20, 1986, with 2/3 of 
that surgery being the responsibility of Gann Brothers, Inc., since they were 
uninsured on November 29, 1985, and 1/3 of those expenses are the responsi-
bility of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. In addition, the Applicant 
is entitled to temporary total compensation for the period February 18, 1986, 
through October 20, 1986, or a period of 35 weeks. As indicated previously, 
he is entitled to a 6.7% permanent partial impairment award of the whole 
person from his employer, Gann Brothers, Inc., and a 3.3% permanent partial 
impairment of the whole person from the Workers Compensation Fund. Pursuant 
to Section 35-1-69, the Second Injury Fund has no involvement in this case 
since there is vo indication of any aggravation of a pre-existing condition by 
either of the industrial accidents, and further there is no satisfaction of 
the threshold requirement contained in Section 69. For the record, that 
Section requires that Second Injury Fund participation will be indicated if 
there is a 10% impairment of the whole person due to an industrial accident 
and an impairment of 20% or greater of the whole person from all causes and 
conditions including the industrial accident. In this case, the Applicant has 
sustained a 6.7% impairment of the whole person due to the industrial accident 
of November 29, 1985, and 3.3% impairment of the whole person due to the 
industrial injury of September 10, 1985, neither of which standing separately 
satisfies the threshold requirement. 
At the evidentiary hearing of these matters, it was indicated by the 
Administrator of the Uninsured Employers Fund that the employer, Gann Brothers, 
Inc., has filed a Chapter VII Bankruptcy. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 
1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Tirothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
LaVeme H. Lawrence was present and represented 
Lennard Stillman, Attorney at Law. 
Gann Brothers, Inc., did not appear. 
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35-1-107, the Administrative Law Judge finds and Iconiudes that Gann Brothers, 
Inc., has insufficient assets to pay the Applicant's claim for the industrial 
accident of November 29, 1935, and they were uninsured for workers compensation 
purposes on that date. Accordingly, the Uninsured Employers Fund is liable 
for the Applicant's benefits which are due ana owing as a result of his 
industrial accident of November 29, 1985. With Respect to the payment of the 
medical expenses for the surgery of March 20, 1986, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that as a matter of convenience, those bills should be paid in the 
first instance in full by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. The Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall then be entitled to reimbursement from the 
Uninsured Employers Fund for 6 7% of the medicjai expenses incurred as the 
result of the surgery of March 20, 1 0Q6 
On September 10, 1985, and November 29|, 1985, it would appear that 
the Applicant was earning 59.00 per hour, working forty hours per week, and he 
was single with no dependents, thereby entitling him to temporary total 
compensation in the amount of $240.00 per week, and permanent partial 
impairment benefits in the amount of the statutory maximum of $215.00 per week. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
LaVeme H. Lawrence sustained compensable industrial accidents on 
September 10, 1985, and November 29, 1985, while employed by Gann Brothers, 
Inc. . 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants, Gann Brothers, Inc., and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay LaVernfe H. Lawrence $2,772.00, which 
amount represents 33% of his temporary totajL compensation for the period 
February 18, 1986, through October 20, 1986; said benefits to be paid in a 
lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Gann Brothers, Inc., and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay LaVerne|H. Lawrence compensation at the 
rate of $215.00 per week for 10.296 weeks1 or a total of $2,213.64, as 
compensation for a 3.3% permanent partial impairment of the whole person due 
to the industrial accident of September 10, 1985; these benefits to be paid in 
a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay 
Lennard Stillman, attorney for the Applicant, 
in this matter, the same to be deducted from 
and temporary total compensation awards to the! A3 
to his office. 
$3,016.20, for services rendered 
the aforesaid permanent partial 
.leant and remitted directly 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
shall pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the surgery of March 
20, 1986, in full in the first instance, with reimbursement to be had from he 
Uninsured Employers Fund for 6 7^ of those surgical expenses. The reimbursement 
from the Uninsured Employers Fund shall be had upon the submission of a 
petition by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah to the Administrator of the 
Uninsured Employers Fund indicating the amount expended by the Fund on behalf 
of Mr. Lawrence as a result of his surgery of March 20, 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Uninsured 
Employers Fund prepare the necessary vouchers to pay LaVerne H. Lawrence 
$5,628.00, which amount represents 6 7% of the temporary total compensation for 
the period February 18, 1986, through October 20, 1986; these benefits shall 
be paid in a lump sum 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Uninsured 
Employers Fund prepare the necessary vouchers to pay LaVerne H. Lawrence 
compensation at the rate of $215.00 per week for 20.904 weeks for a total of 
$4,494.36, as compensation for a 6.7% permanent partial impairment of the 
whole person due to the industrial accident of November 29, 1985; these 
benefits to be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall have 
full rights of subrogation against Gann Brothers, Inc., for benefits paid in 
this matter, pursuant to Section 35-1-107, Utah Code Annotated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Gann Brothers, Inc., shall also be liable 
for payment of attorney's fees in this matter in the minimum amount of 
$250.00, with additional attorney's fees to be granted upon petition of the 
Uninsured Employers Fund to the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, Gann Brothers, Inc., shall 
also pay the Uninsured Employers Fund a penalty of 15% of the total award in 
this matter as required by Section 35-1-107, Utah Code Annotated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
'' ~~ day of March, 198 7. 
ATTEST: 
^f^/fy^r^&f 
Linda J . Stcasburg 
Coircmissiaiv Secretary y 
Timotlw^r^Allen 
Adminis t ra t ive Law Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINd 
I certify that on March " 1)987, a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of LaVeme H. 
Lawrence, issued March 4~~ 1987, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
LaVeme H. Lawrence, 17 74 North 350 West, Sunset, UT 84015 
^Lennard Stiliman, Atty., 211 South State, Suite :;:, SLC, UT 
84111 
Elliot Morris, Atty., Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 560 
South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Seccbnd Injury Fund 
Susan Fixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund 
Gann, 3rothers, Inc., 1070 West 146D0 South, Bluffdale, UT 84065 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
•3 * . By . ^h is. 
Wi lma 
27 
Blame C Palmer, Director 
Pocnev C Smith Assistant (Director 
Workers 
Compensation 
Funds1,, 0/ Utah 
March 5, 1937 
560 Soutn 300 East 
Post Office Box J5-J20 
San Laxe G:v. Utan 8*1 -5-0-20 
(8CD 533-733-i 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Timothy C. Allen 
numi ni st r a 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
150 East 3CC South 
Salt Laxe City, Utah 8^i45-0580 
Re: Claimant: 
File No.: 
Inj Date: 
Employer: 
Case No.: 
Laverne Lawrence 
86-03153 
09-10-35, 11-29-35 
Gann Brothers 
35000369 & 35000*7! 
.en: 
I'm beginning to sound like a broken record (perhaps a voice crying in the 
wilderness), but not wanting to be inconsistent (even though, according to 
Emerson, such a desire might brand me as being among the feeble minded) I am 
writing to request a reconsideration or review of your apportionment of 
compensation benefits in your March 4, 1987 Order in this matter. 
Actually, I'll settle for a modification of your order along the lines of 
my alternative argument below, but in order to preserve the issue should an 
appeal be necessary, I thought I ought to raise my standard objection to 
apportionment anyway. As 
practitioners in the area of 
the Brown, Mountain States 
you know, I am the last of a dying breed of 
Steel , and Anderton decisions still outlaw 
apportionment of disability compensation between insurance carriers in serial 
accident situations. My tenacity in clinging to this doctrine promises to be 
either vindicated or ridiculed in the pending case of Lamp v. Jordan Scnool 
District, et al. Until that landmark decision is rendered my head snail 
remain bloodied, but unbowed. ("The way of a fool is right in his own 
eyes..." Proverbs 12:15) I shall not trouble you with citations to the 
aforementioned authorities as these are well known to you but would merely ask 
that you note my manifold and enlightened arguments against apportionment in 
the GiIbert Lamb case which are incorporated herein by reference. Needless to 
have made the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Second Injury say, you should 
Fund D a v the entire 10% PPD rating along with all of the TTC. 
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I am well aware that the non-aoportionment rujle is hard stuff to swallow. 
By adhering to these tenets, I do not endear myslelf to Susan Pixton and Erie 
Boorman. Bur ar rhe risk of seeming to comoromise my unaeviating devcricn to 
Brown, Mountain States Steel , and Anderton, I nereby submit an alternative 
position whicn I would ask you to consider. Thi 
than the rule set forth in that recent Utah| 
Richie'd Care Center v. Tc^ie^so0, Mo. 20^12, 
i n T^^c^r m e anaiysis nan c a re Q cy rne ^c^r 
assesses to tne Septemoer 10, 193 
opacity ar the r;me of i I! . L C 
accicenc oe 
.19 Ncvemoer 29, 1 
applying Section oy. 
s, of course, is none other 
Supreme Court decision in 
ed February 12, 1937. Us^ng 
recuires m a r the 3.3% PPI 
considered as a preexisting 
35 accicent for purccses of 
Hence, the TTC a^ter the last accident should be 
and 1/3 to the Second Iniurv apportioned 2/3 to the Uninsured Employers Fund 
Fund. Uncer this alternative position, the Workers Compensation Fund would 
net contest payment of the PPQ attributable to th£ September 10/1985 accident. 
I appreciate your consideration of this Moti| 
albeit its humble form. Ycur indulgence is all 
censide^s the insufferableness o^ dogmatic z\ 
someone else in the office has suggested it rakes 
on for Reconsideration/Review 
the more admirable when one 
alots like myself (although 
one to know one). 
Very truly yours, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Elliot K. 
Attorney 
Morri s 
t Law 
cc: ^ennard Stillman, Atty., 211 S. State, #303L SLC, UT 8*111 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
Susan Pixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund 
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12 Exchange Place 
Salt Laxe City. Utah 84111 
Phone\SO1)364-7363 
EXHIBIT "C" 
LeRoy K Johnson 
LennardW Stillman 
Marcn 18, 1937 
Timcthv C. Allen 
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Re: Claimant: 
In^ Gate: 
Hire lev: 
Dear Judce Allen: 
DI ^ .^c^ accent e m s noes as a reruese rcr reconsideration cf vcur 
Crder entered m ene Laveme Lawrence maeeer on Mar en 4, 1987. Z muse ea.<e 
sore exception to ene Crder sneered and enae excepeion is m agreement witn 
enae provided to ycu cy El lice Morris of ene Werners' Compensation Find. 
In m s leeeer of Marcn 5, 1937, Mr. Morris correcely refers eo ene case cf 
Ricnfield Care Geneer v. Torgerson, 52 UAR 22, w m e n appears eo presene ene 
appropriaee resolueicn cf ene Lawrence case. In tnae case, tne serial accider.es 
were noe considered tcgeener, nowever, were considered to be separaee mcidenes 
in time and tne firse incident: was considered, for tne purposes of paying 
on tne second mcidene, a pre-existing ccndieion. Thae case appears eo presene 
a new rule for a dispcsieion of e m s particular type of case. As an aleemaeive 
resolution of e m s matter, I mignt propose screening along tne following 
lines: 
According eo ene medical panel, Mr. Lawrence had a 15% wnole person 
rating due eo pre-existing conditions prior eo ene injury of Septenoer* 10, 1985. 
Adopting the Torgerson rule for tne purposes cf the Novemcer 29," 1985 accident, 
tne Septemoer 10 accident is also a "pre-existing condition". Therefore, 
implementing Section 69 tne appropriaee ruling would, no deduce ce, enae as 
of Ncvemoer 29 accident daee Mr. Lawrence nad a 15% wnole man impairment, 
as well as a 3.3% wnole rran impairment due to tne Septemoer 10 accident. 
The Novemoer 29 accident would constitute a "significant aggravation" of 
his pre-existing condition, tnae condition w m e n existed pricr to tne 
Novemoer 29, 1985 accident. Insofar as tne Novemoer 29 incident created 
a 6.7% permanent partial impairment, it snould be indisputable tnat that 
constitutes a significant aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Adcotmg 
tne Torgerson rule as well as tne accurate analysis of"tne situation bv" 
i-.cmi ni s er a n ve 
Laveme Lawrence 
9/10/33, 11/29/85 
Gars'. 3rorr.srs 
86C00369 & S60004~5 
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En?lovers Fund, should be responsible for 6-7% permanent partial impairment 
due to the industrial accident of November 29, 1985. i 
I have no prcblsrs with the temporary total compensation order, 
nor do I have problems with the order requiring Gann Brothers, througn the 
Uninsured Employers Fond, to pay 6.7% permanent partial impairment. But, 
it is apparent: that adopting Tcrgerscn the Second Injury Pond as well as 
tne Workers' Compensation Fond of "Jtan are responsible to pay for his 
w - r ^ X l a i — . u uCi.w —wi.o o.a w_ „,C ^—..A-nrlT ,^!J , .^o^. .fl*s sx»u.w _o . <c a. rw-w~—CL-C 
analysis cf Forcerscn as well as Section 53, as well as the rationale behind 
the enactment cf tne paying schedule for the Second Injury Fund, to wit: 
that employers should be encouraged to retain people who have experienced 
injuries on the job or are otherwise handicapped. That was Mr. Lawrence's 
condition as cf November 29, 1985. 
Resoectful 1 v submitted, 
cc: Workers' Compensation Fund 
Second Injury Fund 
Uninsured Employers Find 
Laveme Lawrence 
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MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about March 4, 1987, an Order was entered by an Administrative 
Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about March 9, 1987, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendants, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through 
their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of March 4, 1987, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
X
^V,L\ V 3 t w < W ; U.<-v 
Stebhen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
<22L±^< 
Lenic^ e L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Johjtf Florez j 
Com^ ^ i o n e r 
/ 
Passed by the I n d u s t r i a l Coinmission 
of Utah, S a l t Lake City, Utah, t h i s 
^ ^ _day of Sarch, 1987. 
Linda J . , ^ & t f r a s b u r g S / 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certiry that on -4tereh ^ 1987, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review, in the case of LaVerne Lawrence, issued 
Tj&gs-a ^ L 1987, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
LaVeme H. Lawrence, 1774 North 350 West, Sunset, UT 84015 
--Lennard Stiliman, Atty., 211 South State, Suite 303, SLC, UT 
84111 
Elliot Morris, Atty., Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 560 
South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
Susan Pixton, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund 
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LAVERNE H. LAWRENCE, * 
* 
Appl icant , * 
vs. * ORDER DENYING 
GANN BROTHERS, INC. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
(UNINSURED) and/or * 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, * 
* 
and * 
* 
LAVERNE H. LAWRENCE, * 
* 
Appl icant , * 
v s . * 
* 
GANN BROTHERS, INC. and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On March 4, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding 
benefits to the applicant in the above-captioned case. Two 1985 industrial 
accidents were at issue. Both accidents occurred while the applicant was 
employed with the defendant Gann Brothers. Gann Brothers was insured by the 
Workers Compensation Fund for the first accident (September 10, 1985) and was 
uninsured for purposes of the second accident (November 29, 1985). The 
Administrative Law Judge awarded impairment related to the first accident to 
be paid by the Workers Compensation Fund (3.3%) and impairment related to the 
second accident to be paid by the Uninsured Employers Fund (6.7%). No award 
was made by the Administrative Law Judge for the 15% permanent partial 
impairment which pre-existed both injuries. The Administrative Law Judge 
found that the pre-existing impairment was not aggravated by and did not 
aggravate either of the industrial accidents. Also, the Administrative Law 
Judge found that neither industrial accident resulted in 10% impairment. 
Because there was no aggravation, and because the 10% industrial impairment 
threshold was not met, the Administrative Law Judge found that U.C.A. 35-1-69 
did not provide for an award for the pre-existing impairment out of the Second 
Injury Fund. 
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On March 17, 1987, the attorney for the Workers Compensation Fund 
filed a Motion for Review objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's 
apportioning the permanent partial impairment benefits between the Workers 
Compensation Fund and the Uninsured Employers Fund. The attorney for the 
Workers Compensation Fund contends that this method of awarding benefits 
constitutes unauthorized apportionment of compensation between carriers. On 
March 18, 1987, the attorney for the applicant filed a Motion for Review 
agreeing with the Workers Compensation Fund's Motion for Review and also 
contending that the Administrative Law Judge should have awarded permanent 
partial impairment benefits out of the Second Injury Fund for the 15^ 
permanent partial impairment which pre-existed both industrial injuries. On 
April 1, 1987, the Industrial Commission issued an Order denying the Workers 
Compensation Fund's Motion for Review but neglecting to mention the Motion for 
Review filed by the applicant. On April 24, 1987, the attorney for the 
applicant filed a Request for Ruling on the applicant's Motion for Review. 
The Commission agrees that the issue regarding Second Injury Fund 
benefits has not been ruled on by the Commission. In the applicant's Motion 
for Review, the attorney for the applicant argues that the recent Supreme 
Court ruling in Richfield Care Center vs Tor%erson. 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 
(1987) requires that in adjudicating several accidents at one time, impairment 
related to a prior accident becomes pre-existing impairment for purposes of 
the following accident or accidents. The attorney for the applicant goes on 
to state that as result of this general principal, the Administrative Law 
Judge should have awarded benefits for the permanent partial impairment 
related to the condition pre-existing both industrial injuries. 
The Commission agrees with the Tor%erson rational regarding 
impairment due to one accident becoming pre-existing impairment for purposes 
of a following accident. However, the Commission disagrees that this 
principal causes the Second Injury Fund to be liable for the 15X permanent 
partial impairment which pre-existed the two industrial accidents. The 
Torgerson case discusses only how to apportion liability for compensation 
between the Second Injury Fund and a workers compensation insurance carrier 
where several accidents are being adjudicated at once. The Court does not 
discuss when the Second Injury Fund will be found liable for any pre-existing 
impairment that may exist. Second Injury Fund liability for pre-existing 
impairment is ruled by U.C.A. 35-1-69. That statute provides that there must 
be aggravation of the pre-existing impairment or certain threshold precentages 
must result before the Second Injury Fund is liable to pay for the permanent 
partial impairment related to the pre-existing condition. In the instant 
case, the Administrative Law Judge found no aggravation per the Medical Panel 
Report (see Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 3, last two 
sentences in second paragraph) . As there was no aggravation of the 
pre-existing impairment, U.C.A. 35-1-69 states the Second Injury Fund would be 
liable for that pre-existing impairment only if the industrial injury caused 
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at least 10% permanent partial impairment. tn looking at each accident 
separately or serially, as done by the Supreme Court in the Torgerson case, 
neither the September 11, 1985 accident, nor the November 29, 1985 accident 
caused permanent partial impairment amounting to 10%. As the threshold 
percentage is not met, no Second Injury Fund liability results. Consequently, 
the Commission must deny the applicant's Motion ^or Review requesting an award 
of permanent partial impairment out of the Second Injury Fund. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's March 18, 1987 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Commission Order affirming the Administrative Law 
Judge's March A, 1937 Order, is hereby affirmed. 
Eenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
John Edorez 
Corraaissicner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
J?^*** day of June, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on June J2 4/ . 1987, a copy of the attached ORDER 
DENYING MOTIOM FOR REVIEW in the case of LAVERME H. LAWRENCE was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Laveme H. Lawrence 
1774 North 350 West 
Sunset, UT 84015 
REMAILED JUNE 6, 1987 TO: 
Lennard Stillnan Lennard stillman 
Attorney at Law ^trorney at Lav 
211 South State, Suite 303 12 EXCHANGE PLACE 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 SIC UT 8U11 
Elliot Morris 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. Box 45420 
SLC, UT 84145-0420 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Janet L. Moffitt 
Administrative Law Judge 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
? / 
By £//•??•'///!. V/'1' /- ^ 
Pamela Hayes / 
